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We document that the quality of earnings reported by politically connected firms is 
significantly poorer than that of similar non-connected companies. Moreover, we find that 
earnings quality has no predictive power for the likelihood of establishing connections. 
Hence, we rule out that our results (on average) are simply due to firms with ex-ante poor 
earnings quality establishing connections more often. Instead, our results suggest that, 
because of a lesser need to respond to market pressures to increase the quality of information, 
connected companies can afford disclosing lower quality accounting information. In 
particular, lower quality reported earnings is associated with a higher cost of debt only for the 
non-politically connected firms in the sample.  
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In this paper we investigate whether earnings quality varies systematically with 
political connections in a wide sample of countries and politically connected firms. Overall, 
our results reveal that the presence of political connections is associated with a lower quality 
of accounting earnings. We document that political connections have incremental explanatory 
power beyond country, regulatory, and firm specific ownership characteristics.  
Ex-ante, one could have argued that because connected firms are subject to extensive 
controls and monitoring (including scrutiny by the media), political connections would, in 
fact, be associated with better earnings quality. This, however, is not the case. Based on the 
results in prior research, three explanations are consistent with our general finding that the 
quality of earnings of politically connected firms is poorer than the quality of earnings of 
similar non-connected peers. First, as politically connected firms typically derive gains from 
their connections1 over and above the payments they make,2 insiders may hide, obscure, or at 
least attempt to delay reporting the benefits received with the purpose of intentionally 
misleading investors to gain at their expense (e.g., Schipper, 1989, or Leuz, Nanda and 
Wysocki, 2003). According to this hypothesis, connected firms would be more opaque than 
similar non-connected firms. We employ accruals quality as one specific measureable proxy 
of this general opacity.  
Second, to the extent that politicians provide protection to their related companies so 
that low quality accounting information is not penalized,3 connected firms might simply care 
less about the quality of the information they disclose, and invest less time to accurately 
portray their accruals. In this case, the quality of information would be low due to inattention 
on the part of the firm’s managers. This represents a more benevolent interpretation of poor 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Cull and Xu (2005), Johnson and Mitton (2003), and Khwaja and Mian (2005) for evidence 
of preferential access to credit; Backman (1999) and Dinç (2005) for evidence of preferential treatment by 
government owned banks; Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) for preferential treatment in the award of government 
contracts; and Faccio, Masulis and McConnell (2006) for bailouts. 
2 See Svensson (2003), Cull and Xu (2005), and Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann (2003) for a discussion of bribes, 
and Bertrand, Kramarz, Schoar, and Thesmar (2004), and Fan and Wong (2007) for vote-buying behavior. 
Bertrand et al. (2004) also discuss the employment consequences of connections and their impact on voting for 
politicians. 
3 Judged along a number of dimensions, low quality accounting information is apparently readily discovered and 
penalized. A number of studies have shown that poor earnings quality results in more frequent enforcement 
actions by the SEC (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1996), lawsuits (Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper, 1994), a 
higher cost of both debt and equity capital (Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper, 2004, 2005) and poor future 
returns (Chan, Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok, 2006). 
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accruals quality. Third, it might simply be the case that firms with poor earnings quality are 
more likely to establish political connections. In all cases, political connections would be 
associated with poor information quality, as we find. 
We run two sets of tests to attempt to distinguish among these possible explanations. 
First, for a sub-sample of firms for which the date of establishment of a connection could be 
determined, we investigate whether poor accruals quality has an impact on the likelihood that 
a company establishes a connection in a given year. We find no significant association 
between the quality of earnings and the likelihood that a connection is established. This 
allows us to rule out that, on average, our results are simply due to firms with ex-ante poor 
earnings quality establishing connections more often.  
Second, we assess the need for connected companies to make the investment needed 
to provide good quality accounting information. This second test exploits earlier evidence in 
Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper (2005) who find that, for U.S. firms, poor earnings 
quality is associated with a higher cost of debt (as well as a higher cost of equity). We argue 
that this result may not hold for politically connected firms. For example political pressure 
and intervention on behalf of connected companies may substitute for better quality 
disclosures, and thus mitigate the consequences (i.e., costs) of poor information quality that 
their non-connected peers face.  
To implement this test, we examine two measures of the cost of debt: the average 
realized cost of (total) debt; and the yield to maturity spread on publically issued debt.  This 
latter measure better captures the cost imposed by market participants on firms with poor 
quality reported earnings but misses firms not accessing public debt markets. Our regression 
analyses support the conclusion that the cost of (total) debt is inversely related to the quality 
of reported earnings only for the non-politically connected firms in the sample. That is, 
companies with political connections are apparently insulated from the negative consequences 
of their lower quality disclosures. This provides at least partial support to our second 
hypothesis, i.e., that connected firms need to put less attention in developing their earnings 
predictions. Unfortunately, we cannot directly test the first hypothesis because it would 
require being able to identify events around which connected firms would be expected to 
manage their earnings in a particular direction and in excess of the level of earnings 
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management adopted by similar non-connected peers. A prime candidate as an event for such 
a test would be the provision of government benefits to connected firms – which insiders 
would then attempt to steal. Such events however, are generally not observable on a wide 
scale. 
This paper relates to a growing literature examining earnings quality internationally. 
Economic explanations for poor earnings quality typically focus on agency and governance 
issues. Leuz (2006) documents a positive association between ownership concentration and 
earnings management, even among the subset of foreign firms that cross-list internationally. 
Combined with evidence that firms with concentrated ownership structures are more likely to 
form political ties (Morck et al (2000), Morck and Yeung (2004)), this suggests that 
politically connected firms may also have lower quality reported earnings. Fan and Wong 
(2002) find that the reported earnings of Asian family firms have limited information content. 
They argue that this result is driven by an entrenchment effect, where family firms have more 
incentive and capability to manipulate earnings in order to hide expropriation from minority 
shareholders. Wang (2006) however, finds that founding family ownership is associated with 
higher earnings quality for a sample of S&P 500 firms. While confirming these earlier results, 
we show that political connections are important over and beyond ownership characteristics. 
At a more institutional level, the international evidence presented in Leuz et al. (2003) 
demonstrates that country-level factors, such as equity market development, investor rights, 
and legal enforcement are systematically related to a country’s median level of earnings 
management. They see these country-level institutional factors as limiting the ability of 
insiders to use earnings management to conceal their private control benefits. Haw, Hu, 
Hwang, and Wu (2004) echo these results by arguing that country-level features interact with 
differences in control, and cash flow rights, to produce lower quality accounting information 
in countries with weaker statutory protection of minority rights. Additionally, Leuz and 
Oberholzer-Gee (2006) show that Indonesian firms with political connections to Suharto were 
less likely to access international capital markets. This latter paper provides some results 
suggesting that the benefits of political connections outweigh the costs of increased disclosure 
associated with foreign financing. These papers leave open the question whether political 
connections improve or lower the quality of reported earnings. 
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The next section briefly describes how the political connections database was 
compiled. We then describe how we construct our proxy for accounting earnings quality. 
Sections III and IV present our results and robustness tests. Besides checking whether our 
results are sensitive to several alternative measures of earnings quality, we check that our 
results are not driven by a single country by repeating the analysis by successively dropping 
one country at a time. In section V we provide some justification for the reporting behavior of 
connected firms, and we offer our conclusions in section VI. 
 
I. Political ties. 
The empirical evidence we provide in this study is derived from two primary data 
bases. First, we employ a large firm-level data set on corporate political connections 
developed by Faccio (2006). Second, using underlying accounting data available in 
Worldscope, we construct several measures of accounting earnings quality based on the 
variability of discretionary accruals. As discussed above, we also check whether the effects of 
political connections on accounting information quality depend on characteristics of a firm’s 
ownership structure (e.g., the existence of large shareholders or family control).  
A company is classified as politically connected if at least one of its large shareholders 
(anybody directly or indirectly controlling at least 10% of votes) or top directors (CEO, 
chairman of the board, president, vice-president, or secretary) is a member of parliament, a 
minister or a head of state, or is tightly related to a politician or party. These close 
relationships include cases of friendship, past top political (e.g., a head of state or minister) or 
corporate positions, foreign politicians, and well-known cases of relationships with political 
parties, as further discussed below.   
Connections with government ministers include cases in which the politician himself 
is a large shareholder or a top director, as well as cases where a politician’s close relative 
(e.g., the son or daughter) holds such positions. For example, Arnoldo Mondadori Editore is 
included among our connected firms since it is controlled by Silvio Berlusconi, the Italian 
Prime Minister. Konsortium Logistik Berhad is included in the sample since its chairman, 
Mirzan bin Mahathir, is the son of the Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad. 
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Connections with a member of parliament, however, are recorded only when members 
of parliament themselves are shareholders or top directors, but do not include cases when such 
positions are held by relatives. Examples of connections with members of the parliament 
include firms such as Fiat (Italy), Taittinger (France), Rolls-Royce (U.K.), and Enron (U.S.). 
However, H. J. Heinz Company (U.S.) is not included in our sample of connected firms since 
it is not owned by Senator John Kerry but, rather, by his wife Teresa. 
Close relationships consist of cases of well-known friendship, as identified from The 
Economist, Forbes, or Fortune; share ownership or directorships held by former heads of state 
or prime ministers as well as former directorships held by current politicians, foreign 
politicians, and well documented relationships with political parties (as identified in Gomez 
and Jomo, 1997; and Johnson and Mitton, 2003) and other well known connections, as 
indentified in Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) for the U.S.; Backman (1999) for Asia; Fisman 
(2001) for Indonesia; and the Stationery Office (2001) for the United Kingdom.  
To establish the presence of connections, for every publicly traded company included 
in Wordscope, the names of top company directors were taken from Worldscope, Extel, 
company websites, and Lexis-Nexis, and block-holders were identified from Claessens, 
Djankov, and Lang (2000), Faccio and Lang (2002), the web sites of the stock exchanges or 
their supervisory authorities, Worldscope, and Extel. The Chiefs of State directory (CIA, 
2001) and the official website of the country’s government and parliament were used to 
gather the names of members of parliament or government. Countries that did not make such 
information available online were excluded from the sample, resulting in an initial sample of 
47 countries.  
Typically, only a director’s family name and initials were reported in Wordscope. 
Thus, their names were manually cross checked with those of members of governments and 
parliaments using Extel, company websites, and extensive searches on Lexis-Nexis. To 
minimize data errors, if there was not enough information available to ensure that the person 
in question was the same, the company was not included in the sample of connections. 
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It may be worth pointing out that Government controlled firms are not included in the 
definition of connections, unless a government minister or a member of the parliament sit on 
their boards or own large stakes in the company.  
For this study, we start by focusing on countries with at least 5 politically connected 
companies in the Faccio (2006) database, which results in an initial sample of 20 countries 
and 17,435 companies. Matching this sample to those firms with the necessary accounting 
data ultimately reduces our sample as described below. The final sample of companies, 
including the number of connected companies, by country, is presented in Table 1, and is 
discussed in Section III below. We first describe our measure of earnings quality using data 
on accruals. 
 
II. The quality of accounting earnings data. 
Users of accounting information are generally interested in assessing current 
performance as well as estimating future performance, and there is considerable debate 
concerning how well various accounting measures reflect these goals. Some of a firm’s 
transactions require only a mechanical application of accounting rules while other types rely 
on the judgment of the firm’s managers and accountants. This judgment introduces errors – 
both intentional as well as unintentional. Intentional errors are often referred to as 
discretionary. However, with respect to quality, the source of the error does not matter; both 
types reduce the quality of accounting information. 
Reported earnings are considered a primary indicator of information quality (e.g., 
Dechow, 1994, and Dechow et al., 1998).4 Since a firm’s earnings differ from cash provided 
from operations by the amount of reported accruals, a standard practice is to focus on the 
absolute magnitude and/or the variability of accruals to assess earnings quality. In particular, 
since accruals include both discretionary and non-discretionary components, and since 
discretionary accruals are believed to better reflect managerial judgment, most earnings 
quality research focuses on discretionary accruals.  
                                                 
4 Dechow (1994) reports that if stock returns are used as a measure of performance, earnings are more highly 
correlated with stock returns than are current period cash flows. In Dechow et al. (1998), earnings are shown to 
be a better proxy for future cash flows than current cash flows. Hence, earnings are often used in firm valuation 
models as well as a measure of firm performance. 
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Sloan (1996) finds that the accrual portion of earnings is less persistent than cash 
flows, implying that firms with high levels of accruals have lower quality earnings. Other 
studies suggest that managers affect the direction and magnitude of accruals, including Healy 
and Whalen (1999), and Dechow, et al. (1996), and Richardson et al. (2003). Dechow et al. 
(1996), for example, find that 38 firms subject to SEC accounting and auditing enforcement 
release reported higher accruals than a control group, and Richardson, et al. (2003) document 
that firms reported higher accruals in periods preceding earnings restatements. However, 
given the inherent negative autocorrelation in accruals, opportunistic use will result in 
‘excessive’ variability in earnings.5  
We follow other researchers (e.g., Ashbaugh, LaFond, and Mayhew, 2003, Francis, 
LaFond, Olsson, Schipper, 2005, Liu and Wysocki, 2007, Raman, Shivakumar, and Tamayo, 
2008) and estimate discretionary accruals as the unexplained residual error estimated from a 
benchmark model of accounting accruals. In some studies, the sign of discretionary accruals is 
important, e.g., Shivakumar (2000), and the residuals themselves are examined. In this study, 
the variability of discretionary accruals is the primary object of interest.6 In this formulation a 
higher variance (or absolute magnitude) of unexplained accruals is, ceteris paribus, associated 
with lower quality earnings data.7 There are two primary reasons behind our choice. First, we 
do not focus on a particular event around which one could reasonably hypothesize that 
connected firms will tend to under-, or over-report, their earnings more than their non-
connected peers, as we do not have such an event. Rather, we focus on the cross-section of 
firms. Thus, we do not have a particular prediction about the direction of the reporting bias. 
Second, Francis et al. (2005) argue that a firm with consistently large unexplained accruals 
will have a low standard deviation of unexplained accruals. They argue that such a firm “has 
relatively good accruals quality because there is little uncertainty about its accruals. For such 
a firm, the accruals map poorly into cash flows but this is a predictable phenomenon, and 
                                                 
5 For example, suppose an economic event results in a firm recognizing sales in period t. However, the firm 
allows the customer to pay within 90 days. In this case, an accrual (accounts receivable) is created and will 
reverse in the future when the cash is collected. 
6 Our results are not dependent on a particular model of discretionary accruals as shown in robustness results in 
Table 5.   
7 Hribar and Nichols (2007) caution that higher variance of discretionary accruals may simply reflect higher 
variance of cash flows.  Hence in our regression analysis we follow their suggestion and explicitly control for the 
variability of cash flows as well as other potentially correlated firm-level characteristics. 
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should not be a reason for priced uncertainty” (p. 303). In practice, in the cross-sectional tests 
in Tables 2-5, for each firm, we compute variability as the standard deviation of unexplained 
accruals computed over (a) 2001-2005 or (b) 1996-2005. The longer window employed 
reflects our desire to capture systematic aspects of a firm’s earnings quality rather than the 
effects of short term noise in the data.  
Our primary measure of discretionary accruals is a performance-adjusted current 
accruals measure (REDCA) based on the method used in Ashbaugh, LaFond, and Mayhew 
(2003). REDCA is computed as the difference between total current accruals (TCA) and 
expected performance (i.e., ROA) adjusted total current accruals (EPTCA) as follows:  
 
 REDCAijt =  TCAijt – EPTCAijt.  (1) 
Where TCA and EPTCA are computed as follows: 
ijtTCA = ∆(Current Assets)ijt  – ∆(Current Liabilities)ijt  – ∆(Cash)ijt  
+ ∆(Short term and Current long term Debt)ijt, all deflated by lagged total assets.  
 
 Where, ∆ is the first difference (with respect to time) operator, and 
Current Assets (WC02201) is the sum of cash and equivalents, receivables, inventories, 
prepaid expenses and other current assets.  
Current Liabilities (WC03101) represents debt or other obligations that the company 
expects to satisfy within one year.  
Cash (WC02001) represents the sum of cash and short term investments.  
Short Term and Current Long Term Debt (WC03051) represents that portion of financial 
debt payable within one year including current portion of long term debt and sinking 
fund requirements of preferred stock or debentures.  
Assets (WC02999) are total assets. 
 To estimate the expected performance-adjusted total current accruals (EPTCA), we 
first estimate equation (2).  
  9
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where Sales (WC01001) are defined as gross sales and other operating revenue less discounts 
returns and allowances. Lagged ROA, computed as operating income after taxes (WC08326) 
relative to total assets is included to control for firm performance as suggested by Kothari et 
al. (2005). We include inflation and the growth in real (purchasing power parity based) per 
capita GDP as controls for the business cycle in each country.8 The model is estimated by 
Fama-French industry (Fama and French 1997), pooling the data across countries using all 
firms with the requisite accounting data in any given year. We exclude financial firms (SIC 
6000-6999) throughout the analysis. 
 Using the parameters from equation (2), expected performance-adjusted total current 
accruals (EPTCA) are computed as follows in equation (3):  
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Where ∆AR denotes the change in accounts receivables (and is included as suggested by 
Dechow et al. (1995)) and all other variables are defined earlier. 
Our two primary measures of accrual quality are REDCA_5yrs and REDCA_10yrs, 
which are computed as the standard deviation REDCA during 2001-2005 or 1996-2005 in 
equation (1). Since requiring 10 years of data may introduce survivorship bias in our results, 
we also measure accrual quality as the standard deviation of REDCA using only 5 years of 
data (REDCA_5yrs).9 A higher residual standard deviation reflects lower quality reported 
earnings. We also compute several additional measures of accruals quality as discussed in the 
robustness section and reported in Table 5. 
                                                 
8 The source for the business cycle measures is the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook 
Database, April 2009, (www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/weodata/index.aspx). Alternately, we used 
real GDP growth (not PPP adjusted or on a per capita basis) with similar results. 
9 Francis et al. (2004) and Francis et al. (2005), use 10 years, and 5 years of data respectively in estimating the 
standard deviation of accruals.  
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III. Descriptive statistics. 
Matching the accounting data from Worldscope with the data on political connections 
from Faccio (2006) described in Section I, and requiring that there be at least one connected 
firm in each country, our final sample (using the 5-year measure of accruals quality) includes 
4,954 firms, of which 209 are connected to a politician, from 19 countries. The sample using 
the 10-year measure of accruals quality results in a final sample of 4,308 firms, of which 168 
politically connected firms. Table 1 presents snapshots of a number of summary statistics at 
the country level. The overall impression is that there is wide variation in the sample across 
all of the country-level measures tabulated.  
[Table 1 goes about here] 
For example, there is variation in both the number of firms and the number of 
connected firms per country. The countries range from poor (India, Indonesia, and the 
Philippines) to rich (e.g., Denmark, and the United States), from high corruption (the 
Philippines, India and Indonesia) to low corruption (Denmark, Singapore and Switzerland). 
Finally, the average firm size (1997 U.S $ market capitalization) varies widely, with relatively 
large firms sampled in France, Switzerland, and the United States. We define the additional 
control variables presented in Table 1 in more detail when describing our regression analysis 
(in section III.b) below.  
Given this cross-country variation, we take several precautions in our regression 
analysis. First, a natural concern is that this wide cross-country variation might increase the 
potential for extreme observations. Hence, we repeated our main analysis after first 
identifying and then eliminating the top/bottom 5% of residuals. Though we do not report 
these analyses in tables, we find the results are robust to the exclusion of outliers. Secondly, 
we repeated our benchmark analysis after eliminating entire countries, one at a time, from the 
analysis. Again, as we show in the robustness section, we find the results generally robust to 
this precaution. We also adjust the estimated standard errors for clustering at either the 
country/industry level (when our analysis is cross-sectional), or at the firm level (when the 
analysis involves a panel structure with repeated firm level observations). 
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III.a. Comparisons Across Samples 
Table 2 presents the associations of our two primary measures of accounting 
information quality vis-à-vis the specific connections variables, and firm ownership 
structures. Ceteris Paribus, higher values of these variables indicate lower earnings quality. In 
the first set of two columns we focus on the (5-year) standard deviation of discretionary 
accruals computed from equation 1. In the second set of columns we display the same 
information for the (10-year) standard deviation of discretionary accruals. 
Each set of three rows present statistics by firm characteristic. For example, there are 
209 connected firms for which we can compute the 5-year standard deviation, and its mean 
value for connected firms is 5.751, and is 5.206 for other non-connected firms. The difference 
between these means is statistically significant. We note an important caveat that works 
against us in detecting significant differences in the quality of accruals between connected and 
non-connected firms in these simple sample comparison tests: as research has shown that 
connected firms tend to be relatively large, and large firms tend to have better accruals 
quality, without a control for firm size our inferences are likely to be biased. This is possibly 
behind the insignificant difference using the 10-year measure. Thus, the results in Table 2 
need to be interpreted with caution. 
 [Table 2 goes about here]  
Closely held firms, (e.g., family firms) may also be more inclined to establish political 
connections (Morck et al., 2000, Morck and Yeung, 2004). Hence, in an effort to insure that 
our political connections indicator is not mixing the effects of a firm’s ownership structure 
and the effects of its connections on its reporting incentives, we examine family firms 
(Family) separately. The difference in earnings quality between family (i.e., firms with a large 
family or individual shareholder controlling at least 20% of the votes) and non-family firms is 
highly statistically significant (p-values < 0.001), with family firms exhibiting lower quality 
earnings than non-family firms.  
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Overall, the analysis suggests that there are differences in discretionary accruals for 
connected and non-connected firms, and for family versus non-family firms. Of course, these 
simple comparisons cannot answer the questions of whether connections matter for earnings 
quality after controlling for country characteristics, such as the overall level of corruption 
within a country, or on other firm attributes, e.g., its size, operating volatility, market to book, 
or leverage. For these questions we turn to a regression analysis. 
 
III.b. Control variables 
Prior to reporting our regression results, we describe a number of firm and country 
characteristics that we use as controls in our regression analysis. Their inclusion is motivated 
by prior studies that have found them associated with the quality of accounting information at 
the firm or at the country level (Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 2007, Fan and Wong, 2002, 
Hribar and Nichols, 2007, Leuz et al., 2003, Leuz, 2006).  
We introduce controls for the size of the voting stake held by the largest ultimate 
shareholder (Control). The ownership data are taken from Claessens, Djankov, and Lang 
(2000), Faccio and Lang (2002), the web sites of the stock exchanges or their supervisory 
authorities, Worldscope, and Extel. The ownership related data are generally recorded as of 
the end of 1997. Control is constructed according to La Porta et al. (1999), who argue that an 
investor can gain control in a corporation by directly owning a controlling stake, or indirectly 
through holding shares in another corporation. In the first case, an investor’s share of control 
rights will correspond to the fraction of votes he is entitled to express because of the shares 
that he owns. In the second case, the investor’s share of the control rights is measured by the 
weakest control link along the pyramid. We also define Family as a dummy variable equal to 
1 if the largest shareholder is a family or individual controlling at least 20% of the votes, and 
0 otherwise. 
Additional firm characteristics included in the regressions are computed using 
accounting data taken from Worldscope, and measured as of 2001.10 First, a measure of the 
                                                 
10 Fixing the independent variables as of 2001 makes the assumption of independence and exogeneity somewhat 
more plausible given that our dependent variable is measured over a 5 year period ending in 2005. We did 
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firm’s Operating Cycle is included as suggested by Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper 
(2004), and is defined as the log of the sum of days in receivable and days in inventory. Next, 
the firm’s size, Ln Mkt Cap, is measured as the natural log of the company’s market 
capitalization (WC07210) in US dollars.  
Hribar and Nichols (2007) and Liu and Wysocki (2007) show that the results of tests 
using unsigned measures of accruals quality are likely to be biased if no appropriate controls 
for operating volatility are used. Thus, we control for a number of operating volatility 
measures (measured over the same time period as the dependent variable). First, we employ 
the volatility of cash flows over total assets, (CFO/TA), during 2001-2005. We defined cash 
flows (CFO) as: 
ijtijtijtijt onAmortizatiandonDepreciatiTCAitemsextrabeforeIncomeCFO  , 
where ijtonAmortizatiandonDepreciati  (WC01151) is the sum of depreciation, depletion and 
amortization expenses; ijtTCA = {∆(Current Assets)ijt  – ∆(Current Liabilities)ijt  – ∆(Cash)ijt  + 
∆(Short term and Current long term Debt)ijt}; ijtitemsextrabeforeIncome  is defined as 
income before extraordinary items and preferred and common dividends, but after operating 
and non-operating income and expense, reserves, income taxes, minority interest and equity in 
earnings (WC01551); and Assets (WC02999) are the sum of total current assets, long term 
receivables, investment in unconsolidated subsidiaries, other investments, net property plant 
and equipment and other assets. Second, we control for the volatility of sales over total assets, 
(Sales/TA), during 2001-2005. Further, we control for the annual growth of sales 
(WC08631) during 2001, Sales growth, and the standard deviation of the annual growth of 
sales, (Sales growth), during 2001-2005. 
We also control for Market-to-book, defined as the ratio of market capitalization to 
book value of equity (Market-to-book), and Leverage, defined as total debt as percentage of 
total assets (WC08236). 
                                                                                                                                                        
however repeat all of the empirical analysis defining the independent variables as of 2005. None of our 
conclusions are affected by this choice.  
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Finally, we note that countries with weak institutions may also have lower earnings 
quality, as documented in Leuz et al. (2003). Hence we also include country-level variables 
(Anti-Director Rights, and Corruption) as separate controls since a higher proportion of firms 
are connected in countries with weaker institutions.11 Anti-Director Rights is the updated 
index of Anti-Director Rights (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2008). “The 
index covers the following six areas: (1) vote by mail; (2) obstacles to the actual exercise of 
the right to vote (i.e., the requirement that shares be deposited before the shareholders’ 
meeting); (3) minority representation on the Board of Directorships through cumulative 
voting or proportional representation; (4) an oppressed minority mechanism to seek redress in 
case of expropriation; (5) pre-emptive rights to subscribe to new securities issued by the 
company; and (6) right to call a special shareholder meeting.” 
Our measure of Corruption within a country is taken from Transparency International 
(www.transparency.org). The index measures the “degree to which corruption is perceived to 
exist among public officials and politicians. It is a composite index, drawing on 14 different 
polls and surveys from seven independent institutions, carried out among business people and 
country analysts, including surveys of residents, both local and expatriate.” Corruption 
represents “the abuse of public office for private gain.” Transparency International’s index for 
1997 is rescaled from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating higher corruption 12. 
 
III.c. Regression Analysis  
Table 3 presents the results from OLS regressions in which the dependent variable is 
the standard deviation of the variable computed in equation (1) computed over a 5 year period 
(2001-2005). In all the regressions, the dependent variable is multiplied by 100. The 
independent variables are measures of connections, ownership variables, and other company 
and country-level attributes.  
                                                 
11 Another way to control for country effects such as the incidence of political connections is by explicitly 
controlling for country fixed effects in the construction the dependent variable. In Table 5, we do this in several 
of our alternative measures of discretionary accruals, and our results remain virtually identical. 
12 The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index is published annually, beginning in 1995 with 
rankings for 41 countries; by 1997, the number of countries had increased to 52, and included all our firms’ 
home countries.  
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Moulton (1990) strikingly illustrates how clustering within a group biases estimated 
standard errors downward. The problem affects the standard errors on aggregate effects (e.g., 
corruption), on individual-specific response variables (e.g., earnings quality). In particular, 
since intra-group (e.g., a country/industry) observations share common, perhaps 
unobservable, characteristics, a fundamental assumption (i.e., independence) of most 
estimation methods is violated. Thus, in the regressions, unless otherwise noted, we report t-
statistics based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country/industry level.  
[Table 3 goes about here] 
In Regression (1), we find that connections are positively and significantly related to 
lower accruals quality (p-value = 0.016). The magnitude of the coefficient is economically 
large, and indicates that the presence of connections is associated with a 12% increase in the 
dependent variable (0.647/5.229).13  
Other firm-specific controls are also statistically significant in regression (1). 
Consistent with earlier studies, we find that the standard deviation of discretionary accruals is 
lower for larger companies; and, it increases with the length of the firm’s operating cycle, the 
volatility of sales, sales growth and its volatility, though it is not statistically significant for 
sales growth (Hribar and Nichols, 2007, Liu and Wysocki, 2007, LaFond, Lang, Skaife 2007). 
We also find a negative correlation between the standard deviation of discretionary accruals 
and leverage.  
As for the country-level controls, we find that weak institutions are associated with a 
higher standard deviation of discretionary accruals. In particular, the standard deviation of 
discretionary accruals is higher in countries that provide poor legal protection of minority 
shareholders (e.g., low Anti-Director Rights), and it is also higher in more corrupt countries. 
These results corroborate early findings by Leuz et al. (2003). 
Fan and Wong (2002) find that closely held companies disclose less meaningful 
accounting information; hence in regressions (2) and (3) we add controls for ownership 
structure. To the extent that our measures of connectedness are correlated with ownership 
                                                 
13 5.229 is the sample average of (REDCA_5yrs×100) the dependent variable. 
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variables, we need to assess their robustness to the inclusion of these additional controls. We 
begin by controlling for the concentration of control (voting rights) in the hands of the largest 
shareholder (Control).To better separate the alignment and entrenchment effects present at 
different levels of concentration of control, we also add the squared value of control in the 
model. We find that the quality of accruals is lower in firms with a more concentrated 
ownership structure. Importantly, the coefficient on political connections declines slightly, but 
remains statistically significant.  
In regression (3) we isolate family firms. We find evidence that companies with a 
large family-block-holder use more discretion in reporting their accounting numbers, 
consistent with results in Fan and Wong (2002). Thus, these results suggest that concentration 
of voting rights, ownership, and political connections affect the quality of accounting 
information that firms provide.  
As noted above, using 5 years of data to compute our dependent variable (as in Table 
3) potentially introduces a lot of noise. To address this issue, we repeat the analysis using the 
standard deviation of residuals during 1996-2005. The results are reported in Table 4. We 
continue to adjust standard errors for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the country/industry 
level.  
 [Table 4 goes about here] 
All the results on political connections are supported when we use the longer period 
(ten years) to measure earnings quality. Regression (1) shows that being connected results in a 
12% (0.784/5.714) increase in the dependent variable (e.g., thus results in lower earnings 
quality). This result is significant at the 1% level. Higher concentration of ownership is 
associated with lower accruals quality, as found previously, and the impact of connections 
remains economically and statistically significant. When we isolate family firms in regression 
(3) we find evidence that companies with a large family-block-holder use more discretion in 
reporting their accounting numbers as before.  
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IV. Robustness tests.  
IV.a. Exclusion of individual countries and differences across countries. 
To provide assurances that our results are not driven by any specific country, we 
recursively repeat our estimation of regression (1) in Tables 3 and 4, omitting a different 
country each iteration. These results are not reported in tables for space considerations, but 
can be summarized as follows. When the 5-year standard deviation of the discretionary 
accruals measure is used as the dependent variable, the coefficients on connections are always 
positive, ranging from 0.407 to 0.792. The coefficient is significant in 17 out of 19 
regressions, with a p-value of 0.052 or lower; only when we exclude Japan or the United 
Kingdom, does the coefficient lose statistical significance (p-values of 0.146 and 0.171, 
respectively). When the 10-year measure is employed, the coefficients on connections range 
from 0.140 to 0.971. The coefficient is significant in 18 out of 19 regressions, with a p-value 
of 0.053 or lower; the coefficient loses statistical significance only when we exclude Japan. 
The lack of significance after the exclusion of Japan or the U.K. appears to be due to 
the lower power of tests that rely on a substantially smaller sample size. Connections, in fact, 
remain significant if we include all countries in the regressions, and add country dummies to 
the regression specifications. 
A related question is whether the link between connections and transparency differs 
across countries and economies. To assess this possibility, we added, one at the time (to the 
model (1) of Table 3) interaction terms between Connected and Corruption, Connected and 
Anti-director rights, and Connected and per-capita GDP. None of those interaction terms 
turned out to be significant. For example, the coefficient of the interaction between Connected 
and Corruption is 0.034 (t-stat=0.25); the coefficient of the interaction between Connected 
and Anti-director rights is 0.417 (t-stat=1.36); the coefficient of the interaction between 
Connected and ln(per-capita GDP) is -0.277 (t-stat=-0.73). 
 
IV.b. Transformations of the dependent variable and alternative estimation methods 
By construction, the dependent variable in our regression models is positive. Because 
of this truncation, the disturbance terms may not be normally distributed. One possible 
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solution to this problem is to use a logistic transformation, where the new dependent variable 
is computed as: 
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In this case iz  satisfies  iz , and thus the truncation problem is avoided. We 
can therefore employ this specification to assess the robustness of our previous results in 
Table 3. For space reasons, these robustness results are not tabulated. When allow   to 
(alternatively) assume a value of 0.001, 0.01, or 1 and re-run the regressions. We find that the 
coefficient of Connected ranges between 0.109 and 0.112, and is statistically significant at 
conventional levels, with a p-value of less than 0.10.  
We also re-run our specifications alternatively employing a Tobit estimation model, 
and using the log of our accruals quality measure as the dependent variable, to avoid 
truncation at zero. Though not reported to conserve space, all our results are unchanged.  
 
IV.c. Alternative measures of earnings quality. 
In Table 5 we present the results of twelve different estimations. In each of the first 
seven regressions, we consider different measures of earnings quality that have been 
suggested by other research. In regressions (7) through (12) the dependent variable is the 
median of the absolute value of discretionary accruals, rather than the standard deviation, 
during 2001-2005. All models below are estimated by industry including business cycle 
controls.  
The measures are defined as follows: 
[Table 5 goes about here]  
PADCA is a portfolio performance-adjusted measure of discretionary accruals. It is the 
discretionary accruals (as measured in equation 1, though excluding the ROA term in 
  19
equations 2 and 3) for the firm minus the median industry discretionary accruals based on 
decile ranks of ROA for each industry determined in the prior year.  
 PADCA_5yrs is the standard deviation of PADCA over 2001-2005. The results are 
presented in Column 1 of Table 5.  
 PADCA_MEDIAN is the median of the absolute value of PADCA, computed over 
2001-2005. The results are presented in Column 8 of Table 5.  
DCA is a measure of discretionary accruals estimated using the basic Jones (1991) model. 
 DCA_5yrs is the standard deviation of DCA over 2001-2005. The results are presented 
in Column 2 of Table 5. 
 DCA_MEDIAN is the median of the absolute value of DCA. The results are presented 
in Column 9 of Table 5. 
REDCA2 is the same as the REDCA model (equation 1) but estimated with country dummies. 
 REDCA2_5yrs is the standard deviation of REDCA2 over 2001-2005. The results are 
presented in Column 3 of Table 5.  
 REDCA2_MEDIAN is the median of the absolute value of REDCA2, computed over 
2001-2005. The results are presented in Column 10 of Table 5.  
PADCA2 is the same as PADCA (above) but estimated with country dummies.  
 PADCA2_5yrs is the standard deviation of PADCA2 over 2001-2005. The results are 
presented in Column 4 of Table 5.  
 PADCA2_MEDIAN is the median of the absolute value of PADCA2, computed over 
2001-2005. The results are presented in Column 11 of Table 5.  
DCA2 is the same as DCA (above) but estimated with country dummies. 
 DCA2_5yrs is the 5 year standard deviation of the residuals resulting from the Jones 
(1991) model estimation. The results are presented in Column 5 of Table 5. 
  20
 DCA2_MEDIAN is the median of the absolute value of DCA2. The results are 
presented in Column 12 of Table 5. 
We also include two additional measures for completeness. 
 DISCRETIONARY ACCRUALS is the standard deviation of accruals over 2001-2005. 
The model is estimated by industry using the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model which 
includes lagged, concurrent, and future period’s cash from operations in the estimated 
model for accruals. We adjust the Dechow and Dichev model following McNichols 
(2002), who includes the variables from the basic Jones (1991) model in the Dechow 
and Dichev (2002) model. Cash from operations is computed using the balance sheet 
approach (as described in Section III.b.). The results are presented in Column 6 of 
Table 5. 
 REDCA_MEDIAN is the median of the absolute value of REDCA as described in 
equation (1), computed over 2001-2005. The results are presented in Column 7 of 
Table 5.  
In Table 5, our results show that connected firms have more variable discretionary 
accruals, i.e., poorer earnings quality. The coefficient of Connected is significant at standard 
levels in all regression employing volatility measures; and it is significant in 4 out of the 6 
regressions in which we employ the median absolute value of accruals. As shown in the table, 
this result is robust to controlling for country-specific aspects such as Anti-director rights and 
the country’s overall level of Corruption, as well as firm-specific attributes such as the firm’s 
operating cycle (Operating cycle), its size (Ln Mkt Cap), the volatility of the firm’s sales and 
cash flows ((CFO/TA), and (Sales/TA)), the growth and variability of its sales (Sales 
growth, (Sales growth)), its market-to-book (Market-to-book) ratio and its Leverage.  
 
IV.d. Are companies with poor accruals quality more likely to establish political 
connections? 
As pointed out in the introduction, several possible hypotheses are consistent with our 
general finding that connected companies have poorer accruals quality. In particular, it might 
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simply be the case that firms with poor earnings quality are more likely to establish political 
connections. If that is the case, we should find that poor (ex-ante) accruals quality is 
associated with a higher likelihood that a connection is established in a given year. To 
investigate this possibility, we estimate the following model of the probability of establishing 
a political connection: 
 
Pr(Connectedi,t=1) = F(1* REDCAi,(t-5,t-1)+ 2* Ln Mkt Capi,t-1 + 3* (CFO/TA)i,(t-5,t-1)+ 
4* (Sales/TA)i,(t-5,t-1)+5* (Sales growth)i,(t-5,t-1)+6* Sales 
growthi,t-1 +7* Anti-director rightsi +8* Corruptioni,t-1 +9* 
Operating cycle i,t-1 +10* Market-to-book i,t-1 +11* Leverage i,t-1 
+12* Capital i,t-1)
 
where Connectedi,t is a variable that equals 0 if company i does not establish a connection in 
year t and equals 1 if it establishes a new connection during year t, F(.) is the cumulative 
distribution function of a standard normal variable. At any time t the sample includes all 
companies with available data on the dependent and independent variables, with the exception 
of (1) connected firms for which we could not establish a date in which the connection was 
created and (2) connected firms that established their political tie(s) prior to 1990. The sample 
period, t, starts in 1990, as data availability is very scarce in Datastream prior to that period,14 
and ends in 2001, as the Faccio (2006) database only identifies connections established up to 
that year. After a company establishes a political connection, we drop it from the sample. 
The regression results in Table 6 show that the quality of accruals has no significant 
impact on a firm’s likelihood of establishing a connection. The coefficients of the accruals 
quality variables are in fact negative denoting that, if anything, companies with (prior) poorer 
accruals quality are less likely to establish a new political connection in a given year. The 
results confirm that firm size is an important determinant of the likelihood of establishing a 
connection; so are (at least in one of the specifications) anti-director rights, corruption, the 
operating cycle, market-to-book, leverage, and the location of the corporate headquarters in 
the capital of the country. 
                                                 
14 This in fact forces us to require that accounting data be available as far back as in 1985, so as to be able to 
compute the accruals quality and volatility variables over the five years prior to the establishment of the 
connection. 
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Although this result rejects the hypothesis that firms with poor earnings quality are 
more likely to establish political connections, we note that the sample of connected firms 
included in these tests is relatively small (74 firms when we use a 5 year measure of accruals 
quality, and 29 firms when accruals quality is measured over a 10 year period). A question 
remains as to the extent to which these results can be generalized to connected firms for 
which we could not establish a date for which the connection was created, and for connected 
firms for which data availability limitations prevent us from being able to compute accruals 
quality prior to the date of establishment of the connection. Thus, the reader should keep these 
caveats in mind when interpreting these results.15  
 
V. Why don’t connected firms care about the consequences of poor earnings quality? 
We have shown that, on average, the accruals quality of connected companies is 
poorer than the quality of accruals of non-connected firms. From an empirical standpoint, a 
number of studies have shown that poor accrual quality results in a number of negative 
consequences at the firm level, including a higher cost of capital (Francis, et al., 2005), or a 
higher likelihood of a lawsuit. Thus, the question becomes why connected firms appear not to 
care about the consequences. One possibility is that their political ties allow mitigating or 
even eliminating such effects. So, for example, it might be possible that lenders of connected 
firms provide them with relatively cheap capital, regardless to the opacity/quality of their 
accounting information. 
                                                 
15 We also considered addressing the endogeneity in the choice to establish a connection by employing a 
treatment effects model. Specifically, in the first stage (the participation equation), we estimate connections 
using the location of the company’s headquarters, Capital, and country dummies, along with the firm-level 
independent variables included in previous regressions (i.e., Table 3). In all specifications the presence of a 
firm’s headquarters in the capital city is a (highly) statistically significant predictor of whether the firm 
establishes a political connection. The Chi-square statistic for the exclusion restriction (i.e., that the coefficients 
on Capital and the country dummies are jointly equal to zero) has a p-value less than 0.001. Moreover, in each of 
the outcome regressions, Connected is statistically significant as well. The estimated coefficient of Connected is 
larger than that reported using OLS (e.g., in Tables 3 and 4), which suggests that connected firms would, in the 
absence of connections, actually have better than average earnings quality. In general the treatment effects model 
has the advantage of using the entire sample – not just the firms which established connections during our 
sample – but, it relies on the assumption that Capital is uncorrelated with the error term in the structural equation 
(e.g., those in Table 3). Since we could not reject this hypothesis, we simply summarize these results in this 
footnote. 
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To address this question, we focus on the cost of debt. This choice is driven by the fact 
that the overwhelming majority of studies on political ties document preferential access to 
credit for connected firms (Cull and Xu, 2005, Dinç, 2005, Johnson and Mitton, 2003, 
Khwaja and Mian, 2005). Thus, perhaps due to political pressure on (government owned) 
banks, connected firms (despite their poor accruals quality) are able to avoid paying higher 
interest rates. If that were the case, this would provide an explanation as to why connected 
firms exhibit significantly poorer accruals quality despite the negative consequences generally 
associated with poor quality. 
 
V.a. Average realized cost of debt. 
We use two approaches to infer the cost of debt. In this sub-section, we follow Francis 
et al. (2005), and Liu and Wysocki (2007), and compute the cost of debt as the ratio of a 
firm’s interest expense in year t (in our case 2005) (WC01251) over the average interest 
bearing obligations outstanding between quarter 4 of year t-1 and quarter 4 of year t 
(WC03255A). The average interest bearing obligations outstanding are computed using 
interim data, when available.  When computing the average interest bearing obligations 
outstanding, we require a minimum of two observations. This gives us the realized cost of 
debt in the company’s local currency. To make these rates comparable across countries, we 
convert them in U.S. dollar terms using the covered interest parity. Thus, given a cost of 
borrowing in the local currency of iLC, we define the dollar cost (iUS) of borrowing local 
currency, 
0
01
0
01
LCUS e
e-e
e
e-e
1ii 

  , where e0 and e1 are the spot and the one year 
forward rates as of the beginning of year t. The dollar cost (iUS) of borrowing is computed, for 
each firm, in each year between 2001 and 2005, and then averaged over this period.16 Thus, 
the regressions in Table 8 employ the geometric average of the cost of debt during 2001-2005 
for each firm as dependent variable.  
Table 7 first reports some preliminary results. In these simple univariate tests we find 
that the cost of debt is higher for companies with poorer accruals. This is true both for 
                                                 
16 We do not go back further to compute the average cost of debt over a longer period between the interim data is 
very limited further back in time. 
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connected and non-connected firms, and for both measures of discretionary accruals. Once 
again however, we wish to evaluate whether the results continue to hold after controlling for 
other determinants of the cost of borrowing. 
[Table 7 goes about here]  
As is standard in the literature, we control for a number of factors that are known to 
influence interest rates via regression analysis, including: leverage, size, the standard 
deviation of sales growth, the rate of growth of sales, market to book, and the interest 
coverage ratio. Leverage is total debt as percentage of total assets (WC08236) of the end of 
2001; size, Ln Mkt Cap, is measured as the natural log of the company’s market capitalization 
(WC07210) in US dollars, as of the end of 2001; (Sales growth) is the standard deviation of 
Sales growth during 2001-2005. We define Market-to-book as the ratio of market 
capitalization to book value of equity; the Interest Coverage Ratio is the ratio of operating 
income (WC01250) to interest expense (WC01251) during 2001.  
To minimize the possibility of finding a spurious correlation between accruals quality 
and the cost of debt, as suggested by Hribar and Nichols (2007), we additionally control for 
the volatility of cash flows over total assets, (CFO/TA), during 2001-2005, the volatility of 
sales over total assets, (Sales/TA), during the same period, and the firm’s Operating cycle to 
capture differences in operating volatility across firms. Because of the presence of outliers, we 
exclude companies with a cost of debt in the top/bottom percentile, as well as companies with 
an interest coverage ratio in the top/bottom percentile. 
[Table 8 goes about here]  
In Table 8, we report two regressions: one for each of our main earnings quality 
measures. We find that for non-connected firms, lower accruals quality (higher standard 
deviation of accruals) results in a significantly higher cost of debt. The interaction term on our 
5-year earnings quality measures with the connected dummy is however negative and 
statistically significant, indicating that this effect is reversed for connected firms. In fact, if we 
add up the coefficient on each earnings quality measure with the coefficient on the interaction 
between earnings quality and connections, we find the sum to be insignificantly different from 
  25
zero, indicating that, for the sample of connected firms, there is no statistical relation between 
the quality of earnings and the cost of debt. 
This indicates that, despite their poor accruals quality, connected firms are not 
penalized by their lenders, which in turn, may be due to political pressures faced by lenders, 
especially in the case of government owned banks. Alternatively, the result may be due to 
greater private information flows between connected firms and the lenders, or to the implicit 
promise of a government bailout in the event of default of an opaque connected firm. From 
our perspective this result provides an explanation as to why connected firms do not appear to 
care about the quality of their earnings, in that (for some reason) there is no penalty applied to 
those firms reporting lower quality information. 
According to Table 8, the cost of debt is positively related to the volatility of cash 
flows/total assets, and it is negatively related to the length of the operating cycle and leverage. 
These results are perhaps surprising. Francis et al. (2005) also find a negative relation 
between leverage and the cost of debt. They suggest that this may be driven by companies 
who chose not to lever because of the particularly high cost of debt they face. In general, 
however, we do not find a relation between the likelihood of bankruptcy (as proxied by the 
interest coverage ratio), and the cost of debt. 
The cost of borrowing used in this section is inferred from periodically disclosed 
information, but suffers from some limitations. A first source of potential bias relates to the 
use of seasonal financing and possible “window-dressing,” where perhaps connected firms 
hide their high leverage at year end; for these companies we would end up inferring high 
interest rates because of the procedure used to compute the cost of debt (this may also explain 
the negative relation between leverage and the cost of debt). We partially address this concern 
by using interim data (where available). A related source of potential bias is that, to a large 
extent, this measure of the cost of borrowing reflects the cost of private debt. To the extent 
that there are private information flows between firms and lenders, there may be little reliance 
on earnings data. Hence private information flows may mitigate the effects of poor quality 
earnings. We note however that absent a tendency for more private information flows 
between connected companies and their lenders, we should have found no relation between 
earnings quality and the cost of debt for either group (connected, or unconnected) of firms; 
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instead we found a relation only for unconnected firms. However, to address these concerns 
further we turn to a setting where private information flows, and potential window dressing 
concerns, are less important. 
 
V.b. Bond issuance.  
In this section, we focus on public debt issuance and measure the cost of debt in terms 
of the spread between the yield to maturity for a given issuance and the yield to maturity of 
treasury bonds with comparable maturity issued by the government of the country in which 
the firm is headquartered. The focus on the yield to maturity spread has several advantages. 
First, it is a direct measure of the cost of debt. Second, since we only focus on public debt, it 
is unlikely that differences in private information flows between lenders and borrowers would 
result in a different impact of accruals quality on the cost of debt for connected vs. non-
connected firms. However, the reliance on public debt also suffers some limitations. First, not 
all firms issue bonds. Bond issuers in fact tend to be large, mature firms. Additionally, 
unconnected firms are marginally more likely to have public debt than connected firms, which 
is consistent with the argument that connected firms shy away from public securities that 
require more transparency to external investors. Despite these limitations, it is important to 
provide validation of the previous results employing a different metric. 
Hence, we focus on all issuances of non-convertible debt (excluding equity- or 
inflation-linked bonds, or bonds with attached warrants) issued by publicly traded firms 
between 1995 to 2007, as reported in SDC Platinum’s Global New Issues database. We 
require the issuer to be publicly traded, and information on the spread over treasury bonds to 
be available. We further require that the spread be no higher than the yield to maturity (which 
would imply a negative interest rate on government bond issuances). These requirements 
yield an initial sample of 11,937 issuances. These data are then matched with company 
information as reported in Datastream. We were able to match the names of the issuers with 
the names of firms in Datastream for 9,829 observations. Finally, we require that sufficient 
data be available to compute the accruals quality measures, as well for the other control 
variables. This reduces the sample to 3,603 observations, which reflect bond issuances by 643 
firms, 23 of which have political connections. In the first regression specification of Table 9, 
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we include all bond issuances. In the second specification, we only include the largest bond 
issued by each firm during a given year. (In both regressions standard errors are adjusted for 
clustering at the firm-level). One caveat is that the number of connected firms in this sample 
is much smaller than those in the previous analysis, thus we do not know the extent to which 
these results generalize. 
[Table 9 goes about here]  
Despite this concern, we note that we find a relatively high correlation of 0.63 
between the yield to maturity spread and the realized cost of debt used in the previous section. 
More importantly, in Table 9, we run regressions similar to those in Table 8, using our newly 
defined measure of the cost of debt. We find a positive (although insignificant) relation 
between the cost of public debt and accruals quality for non-connected firms. However, this 
relation is reversed for the subsample of connected companies. The interaction term between 
Connected and the accruals quality measures is in fact negative and significant. This result 
indicates that connected firms with poor accruals quality are not penalized even when raising 
debt in the public markets. Thus whether we measure the cost of debt using the average 
realized cost of debt (Section V.a.), or using information from the sub-sample of firms issuing 
public debt (Section V.b.), we reach the same conclusion. Namely, lower quality reported 
earnings is not associated with a higher cost of debt for the politically connected firms in the 
sample. While this result does not allow us to tell whether the poorer accruals quality we 
observe among connected firms reflects intentional earnings management, at a minimum it 
provides support to the hypothesis that connected firms face a lesser need to pay attention to 
developing accurate predictions of their accruals, as inattention is not penalized in the 
marketplace. 
 
VI. Conclusions.  
This study documents that the quality of reported accounting information is 
systematically poorer for firms with political connections than for firms lacking such 
connections. This conclusion is based on an analysis of accounting data for over 4,500 firms 
in 19 countries. Political connections appear to be an important predictor of accounting 
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quality even after controlling for several commonly used country level variables such as the 
overall level of corruption, or shareholder rights indicators, and for firm-specific factors 
(ownership structure, size, growth, leverage, market-to-book ratios, or the volatility of cash 
flows or sales growth). While connections are associated with poorer accruals quality ex-post, 
the quality of prior accruals does not explain a firm’s propensity to establish a connection in a 
given period. Thus, we rule out that it is simply the case that firms with poor accruals quality 
end up establishing political connections. 
Two other non-mutually exclusive possible hypotheses are consistent with our results. 
First, it may be that connected companies intentionally disclose low quality information in an 
attempt to mislead investors so that insiders can gain at their expense. Second, it may be that, 
because of the protection they enjoy once connections are established, connected firms face a 
lesser need to devote time and care to develop accurate accruals forecasts. While we cannot 
directly test the first hypothesis, we do provide support for the second. Previous research has 
found that there are costs associated with lower quality accounting information. Our results 
are consistent with this finding, but with a twist. In particular, we provide evidence that lower 
quality reported earnings is associated with a higher cost of debt only for the non-politically 
connected firms in the sample. That is, companies that have political connections apparently 
face little negative consequences from their lower quality disclosures.  
To check the robustness of these results we have considered alternative measures of 
earnings quality, as well as using several different estimation approaches. We have also 
estimated models using transformed dependent variables, including a logistic transformation, 
and we have re-run the regressions eliminating countries one at a time. The results are robust 
to these alternative specifications.  
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Table 1. Countries, firms, and, connected firms included in the sample. 
 
The table includes firms for which REDCA_5yrs× 100 could be computed (see Table 2). Corruption is from 
Transparency International. Anti-Director Rights, are taken from Djankov et al. (2008) 
(http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/dataset). Per Capita Income is defined for 2005, on a 
purchasing power parity basis, and expressed in U.S. dollars, and is taken from the World Economic Outlook 
database from the IMF, available at: http://www.imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=28. 
 
Number of Number Corruption Anti-Director Per Capita Average (US$) 
Countries Companies Connected Rights Income Market Cap 
1 Belgium 16 1 2.5 3 31,244 2,066,107 
2 Denmark 43 1 0.5 4 34,740 839,593 
3 France 123 8 2.9 3.5 29,187 4,933,508 
4 Germany 116 6 1.8 3.5 30,579 3,919,878 
5 Hong Kong 173 3 2 5 33,479 1,132,233 
6 India 141 5 7.2 5 3,320 387,393 
7 Indonesia 66 15 8 4 4,459 117,284 
8 Italy 42 8 5.2 2 28,534 3,203,750 
9 Japan 1,665 26 3.1 4.5 30,615 1,164,469 
10 Malaysia 211 37 5 5 11,201 305,777 
11 Mexico 33 4 6.4 3 10,186 2,603,171 
12 Philippines 26 2 7.4 4 4,923 319,299 
13 Singapore 103 7 0.7 5 28,368 496,132 
14 South Korea 60 2 5.5 5 20,590 895,382 
15 Switzerland 67 4 0.9 3 32,571 4,750,633 
16 Taiwan 79 4 4.4 3 27,721 1,581,786 
17 Thailand 117 15 6.4 4 8,368 142,291 
18 UK 409 48 1.4 5 30,436 2,531,682 
19 US 1,464 13 2.5 3 41,399 4,451,578 
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Table 2. Accounting Information Quality and Political Connections: Univariate Statistics.  
The measures of accounting information quality are the standard deviation (computed over 1996-2005, or 2001-
2005) of the firm’s discretionary accruals REDCA (estimated from equation 3). Connected is a dummy variable 
set equal to 1 if the company is connected to a politician and 0 otherwise. A company is classified as politically 
connected if at least one of its large shareholders (anybody directly or indirectly controlling at least 10% of 
votes) or top directors (CEO, chairman of the board, president, vice-president, or secretary) is a member of 
parliament, a minister or a head of state, or is tightly related to a politician or party. Family is a dummy variable 
set equal to 1 if the largest shareholder is a family or individual who controls at least 20% of the votes and 0 
otherwise.  
 
 REDCA_5yrs× 100  REDCA_10yrs× 100
 N. of Obs. Mean N. of Obs. Mean
Connected = 1 209 5.751 168 6.103
Connected = 0 4,745 5.206 4,140 5.698
Difference (t-stat) (1.91)  (1.32)
  
  
Family = 1 907 5.888 770 6.749
Family = 0 3,380 5.029 3,012 5.363
Difference (t-stat) (5.69)  (8.97)
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Table 3. Standard deviation of discretionary accruals: OLS regressions.  
The dependent variable (REDCA_5yrs) is defined as the standard deviation (over 2001-2005) of the firm’s 
discretionary accruals (estimated from equation 1) × 100. Connected is a dummy variable set equal to 1 if the 
company is connected to a politician and 0 otherwise. A company is classified as politically connected if at least 
one of its large shareholders (anybody directly or indirectly controlling at least 10% of votes) or top directors 
(CEO, chairman of the board, president, vice-president, or secretary) is a member of parliament, a minister or a 
head of state, or is tightly related to a politician or party. For specific types of political connections, Government 
takes the value 1 when the firm’s connection is with a government official; Member of Parliam. takes the value 1 
when the firm’s connection is with a minister of parliament; Other conn. takes the value 1 when the connection 
is a friendship or other indirect connection; Ownership takes the value 1 when the connection is through a major 
shareholder; Directorship takes the value 1 when the connection is through a director of the firm. Control is the 
voting stake held by the largest ultimate shareholder. Family is a dummy variable set equal to 1 if the largest 
shareholder is a family or individual who controls at least 20% of the votes and 0 otherwise. Operating cycle is 
defined as the log of the sum of days in receivable and days in inventory. Ln Mkt Cap, is the natural log of the 
company’s market capitalization in US dollars. (CFO/TA) × 100 is the 5-year standard deviation of CFO over 
total assets (*100), where ijtijtijtijt onAmortizatiandonDepreciatiTCAitemsextrabeforeIncomeCFO  , 
where TCA = {∆(Current Assets)ijt  – ∆(Current Liabilities)ijt  – ∆(Cash)ijt   + ∆(Short term and Current long term 
Debt)ijt}. (Sales/TA) × 100 is the 5-year standard deviation of cash sales over total assets (*100).  (Sales 
growth) is the standard deviation of the annual growth of sales. Sales growth is the annual growth of sales. 
Market-to-book is the ratio of market capitalization to book value of equity. Leverage is total debt as percentage 
of total assets. Anti-Director Rights developed by La Porta et al. (1998) and updated by Djankov, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2008). “The index is formed by adding 1 when (1) the country allows 
shareholders to mail their proxy vote to the firm, (2) shareholders are not required to deposit their shares prior to 
the general shareholders’ meeting, (3) cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities in the board 
of directors is allowed, (4) an oppressed minorities mechanism is in place, (5) the minimum percentage of share 
capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting is less than or equal to 10 
percent, or (6) shareholders have pre-emptive rights that can be waived only by a shareholders’ vote.” 
Corruption is from Transparency International (www.transparency.org). The TI index measures the “degree to 
which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians. It is a composite index, drawing on 
14 different polls and surveys from seven independent institutions, carried out among business people and 
country analysts, including surveys of residents, both local and expatriate.” Corruption represents “the abuse of 
public office for private gain.” The original index is rescaled from 0 to 10, higher value for higher corruption. T-
statistics based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the country/Fama-French 
industry level are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.  
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(1) (2) (3) 
Connected 0.647 b 0.505 c 0.538 b
(2.42) (1.92) (2.05)
Control 0.022 b
(2.24)
Control2 -0.0001
(-0.97)
Family 0.242 c
(1.75)
Operating cycle 1.025 a 0.968 a 0.953 a
(9.50) (8.84) (8.54)
Ln Mkt Cap -0.324 a -0.286 a -0.301 a
(-6.47) (-5.57) (-5.69)
(CFO/TA) × 100 0.107 a 0.160 a 0.160 a
(3.52) (5.94) (5.90)
(Sales/TA) × 100 0.088 a 0.075 a 0.075 a
(4.29) (3.21) (3.21)
(Sales growth) × 100 0.0001 a 0.0001 a 0.0001 a
(3.89) (3.93) (3.98)
Sales growth× 100 0.002 0.002 0.002
(1.29) (1.24) (1.22)
Market-to-book 0.012 0.004 0.005
(1.28) (0.51) (0.56)
Leverage  -0.016 a -0.014 a -0.015 a
(-4.16) (-4.36) (-4.65)
Anti-director rights  -0.282 a -0.323 a -0.342 a
(-2.83) (-3.00) (-3.24)
Corruption  0.090 0.089 0.086
(1.56) (1.55) (1.48)
Intercept 3.339 b 2.811 c 3.489 b
  (2.31) (1.85) (2.19)
Number of obs. 4,585 4,053 4,053
Adjusted R2  33.44% 36.34% 36.00%
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Table 4. Standard deviation of discretionary accruals: OLS and median regressions.  
The dependent variable (REDCA_10yrs) is defined as the standard deviation (over 1996-2005) of the firm’s 
discretionary accruals REDCA (estimated from equation 1) × 100. Independent variables are defined in Table 3. 
T-statistics based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the country/Fama-French 
industry level are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
(1) (2) (3) 
Connected 0.784 a 0.733 a 0.730 a
(2.84) (2.69) (2.69)
Control 0.027 a
(2.73)
Control2 -0.0002
(-1.21)
Family 0.649 a
(3.98)
Operating cycle 1.139 a 1.062 a 1.052 a
(8.82) (8.15) (8.12)
Ln Mkt Cap -0.516 a -0.482 a -0.490 a
(-10.88) (-9.25) (-9.20)
(CFO/TA) × 100 0.088 a 0.141 a 0.141 a
(2.97) (4.88) (4.85)
(Sales/TA) × 100 0.074 a 0.058 a 0.059 a
(4.37) (3.28) (3.27)
(Sales growth) × 100 0.0001 a 0.0001 a 0.0001 a
(3.70) (2.77) (3.00)
Sales growth× 100 0.002 0.002 0.002
(1.14) (1.15) (1.18)
Market-to-book 0.005 c 0.004 0.004
(1.68) (1.09) (1.10)
Leverage  -0.008 b -0.005 c -0.006 c
(-2.30) (-1.69) (-1.84)
Anti-director rights  -0.332 a -0.230 c -0.235 c
(-2.73) (-1.76) (-1.83)
Corruption  0.239 a 0.232 a 0.233 a
(3.91) (3.89) (3.91)
Intercept 5.797 a 4.707 a 5.181 a
  (4.57) (3.43) (3.70)
Number of obs. 3,968 3,543 3,543
Adjusted R2  32.84% 35.43% 35.30%
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Table 5. Robustness tests: Other measures of accruals quality.  
The dependent variable is defined using various measures of discretionary accruals (see Section IV.C) × 100. Connected is 
a dummy variable set equal to 1 if the company is connected to a politician and 0 otherwise. A company is classified as 
politically connected if at least one of its large shareholders (anybody directly or indirectly controlling at least 10% of 
votes) or top directors (CEO, chairman of the board, president, vice-president, or secretary) is a member of parliament, a 
minister or a head of state, or is tightly related to a politician or party. Operating cycle is defined as the log of the sum of 
days in receivable and days in inventory.  Ln Mkt Cap, is the natural log of the company’s market capitalization in US 
dollars. (Sales growth) is the standard deviation of the annual growth of sales. Sales growth is the annual growth of sales. 
Market-to-book is the ratio of market capitalization to book value of equity. Leverage is total debt as percentage of total 
assets. Anti-Director Rights developed by La Porta et al. (1998) and updated by Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and 
Shleifer (2008). “The index is formed by adding 1 when (1) the country allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote to the 
firm, (2) shareholders are not required to deposit their shares prior to the general shareholders’ meeting, (3) cumulative 
voting or proportional representation of minorities in the board of directors is allowed, (4) an oppressed minorities 
mechanism is in place, (5) the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an extraordinary 
shareholders’ meeting is less than or equal to 10 percent, or (6) shareholders have pre-emptive rights that can be waived 
only by a shareholders’ vote.” Corruption is from Transparency International (www.transparency.org). The TI index 
measures the “degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians. It is a composite 
index, drawing on 14 different polls and surveys from seven independent institutions, carried out among business people 
and country analysts, including surveys of residents, both local and expatriate.” Corruption represents “the abuse of public 
office for private gain.” The original index is rescaled from 0 to 10, higher value for higher corruption. All models are 
ordinary least squares estimates. T-statistics based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the 
country/Fama-French industry level are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PADCA 
_5yrs 
DCA 
_5yrs 
REDCA2 
_5yrs 
PADCA2 
_5yrs 
DCA2 
_5yrs 
DISCRET. 
ACCRUALS
Connected 0.687 a 0.631 b 0.607 b 0.604 b 0.576 b 0.697 a 
(2.62) (2.35) (2.45) (2.54) (2.32) (2.92)
Operating cycle 0.964 a 1.028 a 0.900 a 0.875 a 0.907 a 0.796 a 
(9.10) (9.44) (8.63) (8.33) (8.67) (8.01)
Ln Mkt Cap -0.322 a -0.324 a -0.300 a -0.302 a -0.299 a -0.307 a 
(-6.70) (-6.47) (-6.39) (-6.63) (-6.37) (-8.10)
(CFO/TA) × 100 0.103 a 0.107 a 0.107 a 0.100 a 0.107 a 0.094 a 
(3.41) (3.54) (3.69) (3.38) (3.71) (4.24)
(Sales/TA) × 100 0.086 a 0.088 a 0.079 a 0.079 a 0.079 a 0.058 a 
(4.39) (4.31) (4.08) (4.27) (4.09) (4.19)
(Sales growth) × 100 0.0001 a 0.0001 a 0.0001 a 0.0001 a 0.0001 a 0.0001 b 
(3.82) (4.04) (3.72) (3.78) (3.76) (2.11)
Sales growth× 100 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002
(1.00) (1.30) (1.29) (1.07) (1.31) (1.55)
Market-to-book 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.018 b 
(1.22) (1.31) (1.22) (1.08) (1.25) (2.29)
Leverage  -0.016 a -0.016 a -0.015 a -0.015 a -0.015 a -0.014 a 
(-4.28) (-4.26) (-4.07) (-4.11) (-4.16) (-4.06)
Anti-director rights  -0.287 a -0.282 a -0.252 a -0.290 a -0.250 b -0.372 a 
(-2.91) (-2.83) (-2.61) (-3.05) (-2.58) (-4.37)
Corruption  0.080 0.093 0.094 c 0.077 0.095 c 0.088 c 
(1.43) (1.62) (1.72) (1.42) (1.73) (1.73)
Intercept 3.643 a 3.309 b 3.480 b 3.780 a 3.424 b 4.839 a 
  (2.61) (2.29) (2.52) (2.86) (2.49) (4.53)
Number of obs. 4,583 4,585 4,613 4,611 4,612 4,517
Adjusted R2  32.62% 33.39% 32.16% 31.11% 32.10% 30.11%
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(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
REDCA 
_MEDIAN 
PADCA 
_MEDIAN 
DCA 
_MEDIAN 
REDCA2 
_MEDIAN 
PADCA2 
_MEDIAN 
DCA2 
_MEDIAN 
Connected 0.166 0.374 b 0.198 0.363 b 0.550 a 0.293 c 
(0.95) (2.15) (1.12) (2.18) (3.20) (1.73)
Operating cycle 0.773 a 0.673 a 0.747 a 0.600 a 0.517 a 0.585 a 
(10.84) (10.23) (10.46) (8.37) (7.44) (7.79)
Ln Mkt Cap -0.180 a -0.190 a -0.190 a -0.184 a -0.189 a -0.184 a 
(-6.32) (-6.94) (-6.61) (-6.79) (-7.57) (-6.62)
(CFO/TA) × 100 0.038 a 0.038 a 0.038 a 0.040 a 0.041 a 0.040 a 
(3.35) (3.29) (3.54) (3.39) (3.49) (3.41)
(Sales/TA) × 100 0.055 a 0.051 a 0.055 a 0.048 a 0.044 a 0.048 a 
(5.16) (4.94) (5.20) (5.38) (5.10) (5.41)
(Sales growth) × 100 0.0001 a 0.0001 a 0.0001 a 0.0001 a 0.0001 a 0.0001 a 
(4.78) (5.99) (4.39) (4.30) (5.64) (3.45)
Sales growth× 100 0.002 b 0.001 0.002 b 0.002 b 0.002 0.002 b 
(2.28) (1.40) (2.36) (2.31) (1.58) (2.28)
Market-to-book 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.010 c 0.004 0.009 c 
(1.48) (1.62) (1.62) (1.87) (1.12) (1.82)
Leverage  -0.008 a -0.010 a -0.007 a -0.008 a -0.009 a -0.007 a 
(-3.08) (-4.50) (-2.98) (-3.43) (-4.40) (-3.11)
Anti-director rights  -0.081 -0.143 c -0.072 -0.123 -0.148 c -0.131 c 
(-0.99) (-1.76) (-0.90) (-1.60) (-1.88) (-1.71)
Corruption  0.065 0.052 0.068 c 0.094 b 0.062 0.095 b 
(1.60) (1.38) (1.69) (2.49) (1.65) (2.49)
Intercept 1.154 1.950 b 1.318 2.155 a 2.730 a 2.225 a 
  (1.38) (2.43) (1.58) (2.82) (3.69) (2.87)
Number of obs. 4,584 4,584 4,583 4,611 4,605 4,610
Adjusted R2  23.30% 23.37% 23.93% 22.73% 21.68% 22.54%
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Table 6. Determinants of the choice to establish a political connection in year t. 
Probit regression, reporting marginal effects (dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1).  In 
particular, we estimate the following model of the probability of establishing a political connection: 
Pr(Connectedi,t=1) = F(1* REDCAi,(t-5,t-1)+ 2* Ln Mkt Capi,t-1 + 3* (CFO/TA)i,(t-5,t-1)+ 4* 
(Sales/TA)i,(t-5,t-1)+5* (Sales growth)i,(t-5,t-1)+6* Sales growthi,t-1 +7* Anti-
director rightsi +8* Corruptioni,t-1 +9* Operating cycle i,t-1 +10* Market-to-
book i,t-1 +11* Leverage i,t-1 +12* Capital i,t-1)
where Connectedi,t is a variable that equals 0 if company i does not establish a connection in year t and equals 1 
if it establishes a new connection during year t, F(.) is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal 
variable. At any time t the sample includes all companies with available data on the dependent and independent 
variables, with the exception of (1) connected firms for which we could not establish a date in which the 
connection was created and (2) connected firms that established their political tie(s) prior to 1990. Reported z-
stats are based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. REDCA_5yrs (REDCA_10yrs) is the standard 
deviation of the firm’s discretionary accruals REDCA (estimated from equation 1) × 100 for the 5 (10) years 
prior to the establishment of a connection. The other independent variables are defined in Table 3. T-statistics are 
reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
(1) (2) 
REDCA_5yrs  -0.0023 
(-0.48) 
REDCA_10yrs  -0.0039 
(-0.50) 
Ln Mkt Cap 0.0004 a 0.0004 a 
(4.82) (4.14) 
(CFO/TA) × 100 0.0006 -0.0006 
(0.27) (-0.15) 
(Sales/TA) × 100 -0.0000 -0.0005 
(-0.02) (-0.22) 
(Sales growth) × 100 -0.0002 0.0008 
(-0.32) (1.31) 
Sales growth× 100 0.0001 -0.0004 
(0.34) (-0.57) 
Anti-director rights  0.0010 a 0.0011 a 
(4.09) (3.20) 
Corruption  0.0003 b -0.0004 
(2.03) (-0.96) 
Operating cycle -0.0004 c -0.0001 
(-1.68) (-0.21) 
Market-to-book 0.0000 c 0.0000 
(1.74) (0.45) 
Leverage  0.0013 0.0021 b 
(1.63) (2.06) 
Capital 0.0008 c 0.0013 c 
(1.67) (1.82) 
Observed p 0.0020 0.0026 
No. Obs. 36,272 10,948 
Connections 74 29 
Pseudo R2 6.98% 14.47% 
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Table 7. Discretionary accruals and the cost of debt: Comparison across different samples. 
The table reports the average cost of debt for companies falling into different groups. The dependent variable, 
Cost of Debt, is the ratio of a firm’s annual interest expense in year t over the average interest bearing obligations 
outstanding between year-end t-1 and year-end t (× 100). The average interest bearing obligations outstanding 
are computed using interim data, when available. This ratio is converted to U.S. dollar terms using covered 
interest parity. The ratio is computed for each year between 2001 and 2005, and then averaged over this period 
for each firm. Connected is a dummy variable set equal to 1 if the company is connected to a politician and 0 
otherwise. A company is classified as politically connected if at least one of its large shareholders (anybody 
directly or indirectly controlling at least 10% of votes) or top directors (CEO, chairman of the board, president, 
vice-president, or secretary) is a member of parliament, a minister or a head of state, or is tightly related to a 
politician or party. REDCA_5yrs is defined as the standard deviation (over 2001-2005) of the firm’s 
discretionary accruals (estimated from equation 1) × 100. REDCA_10yrs is defined as the standard deviation 
(over 1996-2005) of the firm’s discretionary accruals (estimated from equation 1) × 100.  
Panel A: Accruals quality proxy: REDCA_5yrs   
 Connected Non-connected 
REDCA_5yrs  > sample median 6.66% 6.71% 
 N=99 N=2,183 
REDCA_5yrs  < sample median 5.25% 5.36% 
 N=105 N=2,237 
Difference  1.41% 1.35% 
T-stat for the difference (2.85) (10.00) 
 N=204 N=4,420 
Panel B: Accruals quality proxy: REDCA_10yrs 
 Connected Non-connected 
REDCA_10yrs  > sample median 6.36% 6.66% 
 N=88 N=1,902 
REDCA_10yrs < sample median 4.96% 5.07% 
 N=76 N=1,966 
Difference 1.40% 1.58% 
T-stat for the difference (2.92) (11.97) 
 N=164 N=3,868 
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Table 8. Discretionary accruals and the cost of debt. 
The dependent variable, Cost of Debt, is the ratio of a firm’s annual interest expense in year t over the average 
interest bearing obligations outstanding between year-end t-1 and year-end t (× 100). The average interest 
bearing obligations outstanding are computed using interim data, when available. This ratio is converted to U.S. 
dollar terms using covered interest parity. The ratio is computed for each year between 2001 and 2005, and then 
averaged over this period for each firm. REDCA_5yrs is defined as the standard deviation (over 2001-2005) of 
the firm’s discretionary accruals (estimated from equation 1) × 100. REDCA_10yrs is defined as the standard 
deviation (over 1996-2006) of the firm’s discretionary accruals (estimated from equation 1) × 100. Leverage is 
total debt as percentage of total assets as of the end of 2001; Ln Mkt Cap is measured as the natural log of the 
company’s market capitalization in US dollars, as of the end of 2001; volatility is the standard deviation ((Sales 
growth)) of Sales growth during 2001-2005. ROA is the ratio of operating income (after taxes) to total assets in 
year 2001; the Interest Coverage Ratio is the ratio of operating income to interest expense in year 2001. Because 
of the presence of outliers, we drop companies with a cost of debt in the top/bottom percentile, as well as 
companies with an interest coverage ratio in the top/bottom percentile. All models include additional interaction 
terms between Connected and each of the control variables - - not reported for space reasons. Both models are 
estimated by ordinary least squares. T-statistics based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and 
clustering at the country/Fama-French industry level are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
(1) (2) 
REDCA_5yrs 0.169a   
 (4.77)    
REDCA_10yrs   0.210a 
   (6.61)  
REDCA_5yrs × Connected -0.217b   
 (-2.28)    
REDCA_10yrs × Connected   -0.066 
   (-0.53) 
Connected 0.067  0.474 
 (0.02)  (0.15) 
Leverage -0.031a  -0.031a 
 (-4.96)  (-4.78) 
Ln Mkt Cap -0.048  0.009 
 (-1.03)  (0.19) 
σ(CFO/TA) × 100 0.034b  0.047a 
 (2.23)  (2.87) 
σ(Sales/TA) × 100 0.008  0.001 
 (0.85)  (0.12) 
σ(Sales growth) × 100 0.000  0.000 
 (0.39)  (0.74) 
Sales growth× 100 0.0001  -0.001 
 (0.04)  (-1.53) 
Operating cycle -0.406b  -0.471b 
 (-2.13)  (-2.44) 
Market-to-book 0.031  0.032 
 (1.35)  (1.34) 
Interest Coverage Ratio 0.001  0.000 
 (0.40)  (0.08) 
Intercept 8.145a  7.374a 
  (6.47)  (5.86) 
Number of obs. 4,201  3,735 
Number of connected firms 128  111 
Adjusted R2 7.65% 8.88% 
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Table 9. Discretionary accruals and the cost of debt for bond issuers 
The sample includes all issuances of non-convertible debt (excluding equity- or inflation-linked bonds, or bonds 
with attached warrants) by publicly traded firms between 1995 and 2007, as reported in SDC Platinum’s Global 
New Issues database. We additionally require availability of all data needed to compute the independent 
variables in Datastream. The dependent variable is the basis point spread over treasury bonds with comparable 
maturity. REDCA_5yrs is defined as the standard deviation (over the 5-years preceding the bond issuance) of the 
firm’s discretionary accruals (estimated from equation 1) × 100. Similarly, (CFO/TA), (Sales/TA), and 
(Sales growth) are measured during the 5-years preceding the bond issuance. All other stock (flow) variables 
are measured as of the end of the year (during the year) preceding the issuance. Both models are ordinary least 
squares estimates. T-statistics based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the firm 
level are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
(1) (2)
REDCA_5yrs 0.012 0.020
(0.60) (0.93)
REDCA_5yrs × Connected -0.056 b -0.075 b
(-2.48) (-2.48)
Connected -0.005 0.050
(-0.04) (0.29)
Leverage -0.009 a -0.010 a
(-4.36) (-3.91)
Ln Mkt Cap -0.120 a -0.116 a
(-5.11) (-4.53)
(CFO/TA) × 100 0.037 b 0.039 b 
(2.15) (2.09)
(Sales/TA) × 100 0.005 0.008
(1.05) (1.50)
(Sales growth) × 100 0.011 a 0.016 a
(3.19) (4.14)
Sales growth× 100 0.008 a 0.009 a 
(3.03) (3.39)
Operating cycle -0.165 a -0.205 a 
(-3.59) (-4.11)
Market-to-book 0.037 a 0.033 a 
(3.88) (3.39)
Interest Coverage Ratio -0.016 a -0.021 a
(-3.73) (-4.23)
Intercept 3.513 a 3.597 a
(7.41) (7.87)
Sample 
 
All bond 
issuances 
Largest issuance 
in each given year 
Number of observations 3,603 1,528
Number of different issuers 643 643
Number of connected firms 23 23
Adjusted R2  15.60% 17.91%
 
 
